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Abstract 
The purpose of this empirical work is to understand the reasoning behind debt maturity choices from Portuguese 
SMEs after the 2008 financial crisis and to see if those choices are in accordance with the existing literature. We use 
a sample of 2,000 Portuguese SMEs for the time period of 2009 to 2011. We find an increasing trend on the average 
debt maturity during the three years analyzed. Our results are partially consistent with the liquidity theory where 
intermediate quality firms choose to issue more long term debt while high quality firms tend to issue more short term 
debt. Smaller firms, those more affected by asymmetric information, tend to use debt of shorter maturities. 
Furthermore, we find evidence supporting the clientele argument where firms affected by higher tax rates have longer 
debt maturities. Finally, firms with more growth opportunities are using more short term debt.  
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1. Introduction 
Time has shown the importance of firms choosing the maturities of liabilities in order to avoid 
problems such as overinvestment, underinvestment, risk-shifting, liquidity and signaling. Recent studies 
have shown the importance of debt maturity in periods of credit and liquidity shocks like during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, where the debt maturity structure of industrial firms was put to the test and shown to 
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have serious impacts on companies (Campello et al., 2010; Almeida et al., 2011; Santos, 2011), or the 
financial crisis that occurred in emerging markets in the 90´s, which were caused in part by the mismatch 
of debt and assets maturities (Sachs et al., 1996).  
While most studies focus on large publicly traded firms (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 
1996; Custódio et al., 2013), where information is available for the public, our draws attention to small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) which, because of difficulty in obtaining information, sometimes 
are left behind in the finance literature, although being SMEs the ones who most contribute to job and 
business creation in most countries. The back bone of Europe are the small and medium sized enterprises 
who run 99% of the European economy contributing to two in every three jobs in the private sector and, 
more surprisingly, nine out of ten SMEs in Europe are micro firms with less than ten employees 
(European Commission, 2013). According to the “Instituto Nacional de Estatística” (INE, 2010), in 2009 
there were 348,552 SMEs in Portugal which represent 99.7% of all non-financial business. 
The main objective of this study is to understand if Portuguese SMEs follow the reasoning behind debt 
maturity theories after the 2008 financial crisis. Theories like the agency costs hypothesis (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), information asymmetry hypothesis (Myers, 1984), signaling and liquidity hypothesis 
(Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991), tax hypothesis (Brick and Ravid, 1985; Lewis, 1990) and match 
hypothesis (Myers, 1977).  
2. Literature review and hypotheses  
2.1. Match hypothesis 
Morris (1976) and Myers (1977) suggest that firms should match debt and asset maturities, either: (a) 
to avoid the problem of not having available cash when time comes to pay for liabilities, if debt has 
shorter maturity than assets; or (b) to avoid the problem of having to pay debt obligations when the firm´s 
assets are no longer producing cash flows, in the case of debt having longer maturity than assets. Studies 
like, Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Barclay et al. (2003), and González (2012) confirmed this hypothesis. 
H1: Firms match the maturity of existing assets with the maturity of their debt. 
2.2. Information asymmetry and agency costs hypotheses 
The risk-shifting problem, the overinvestment or underinvestment problems discussed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) give rise to agency costs. As stated by López-Gracia and Mestre-
Barberá (2010), SMEs are a perfect fit to look for agency costs because of less transparency, more 
leverage, more growth opportunities and less fixed assets than large firms. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), managers and shareholders are both utility maximizers so managers will sometimes 
perform in a way to maximize their own wealth, which may not be the most suitable for the shareholders. 
This problem is not as usual in SMEs like it is in large firms because they normally are family owned 
where management and ownership is together, manager/owner always acting in a way to maximize the 
firm's value (Poza et al., 2004). On the other hand, because SMEs are usually highly leveraged, agency 
costs of debt are common and worth looking at. Myers (1977) argues about the underinvestment problem 
where there is a conflict of interests between shareholders and creditors induced by risky debt. Using 
more short-term debt can minimize the firms’ agency costs. Empirical research has found mix results. 
Guedes and Opler (1996) and Ozkan (2000) find consistent results, however, Stohs and Mauer (1996) and 
Danisevská (2002) find no support for the increase in the short-term debt when growth options are higher. 
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H2: Firms with higher information asymmetries use more short-term debt. 
H3: Firms with more growth opportunities will have more short-term debt. 
H4: Firms more affected by agency costs of debt will have more short-term debt. 
2.3. Signaling and liquidity risk hypotheses  
According to Flannery (1986), firms are able to reveal if they are high- or low-quality firms by 
choosing a certain type of debt maturity (short- or long-term). Firms with favorable private information 
signal their projects’ quality by issuing short-term debt. On the other hand, low-quality firms will want to 
delay their assessment by financial institutions in order to try to improve their true state in that time. 
Diamond (1991) argues about the interaction between signaling and liquidity risk caused by short-term 
debt, which while reducing borrowing costs also increases the risk of the company lacking liquidity to 
meet its short term obligations. That interaction will lead high- and low-quality firms to issue short-term 
debt, while medium-quality firms will prefer to issue long-term debt. Barclay and Smith (1995) and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2007) find little evidence for the signaling hypotheses. 
H5: Very high and low quality firms issue more short-term debt. 
2.4. Tax hypothesis  
Kane et al. (1985) predicts a negative relation between debt maturity and the tax advantage from debt, 
and a positive relation with flotation costs. Brick and Ravid (1985) argue that when the yield curve has a 
positive slope, then the interest of issuing long term debt will be higher than those of short term debt but 
only in early years, while lower in later years, which will lead to savings in the expected tax liabilities on 
the long run. Thus, firms should borrow with longer maturities when the slope of the yield curve is 
positive and borrow short term when the slope is negative in order to increase the firm´s market value. 
Lewis (1990) concludes that if the level of debt and debt maturity are chosen at the same time, then debt 
maturity structure would not matter. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) use the tax clientele argument to 
explain a positive relation between the firm´s marginal tax rates and their debt maturities. Antoniou et al. 
(2006) found evidence of the clientele argument. Barclay and Smith (1995) did not find any evidence of 
taxes affecting the debt maturity choice while Stohs and Mauer (1996) found mixed support. 
H6: Firms with higher tax rates will have more long-term debt. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample and variables 
The sample used consists of 1,998 Portuguese SMEs obtained from “Informa D&B” database. The 
1,998 SMEs consist in 1,920 micro sized, 64 small sized and 14 medium sized companies, based on the 
definition of SMEs from the European Commission relatively to the number of employees in each firm. 
The period ranges from 2009 to 2011.  Due to the available data in the balance sheet, the proxy used for 
debt maturity is the proportion of debt maturing in more than one year. We use as determinants of the 
debt maturity choice: leverage (LEV), free cash flow (FCF), firm size, tangibility (TAN), R&D (RD), 
CAPEX (CAPX), financial flexibility (FF), asset maturity term (AMT), ROE (ROE), liquidity (LIQ), tax 
rate (TAX), cash (CAX) and Altman’s Z-score (Z). Variables definitions are presented in the appendix.   
175 Sérgio Costa et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  150 ( 2014 )  172 – 181 
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics and econometric analysis 
We start by analyzing the descriptive statistics on debt maturity to understand its trend in the sample 
period. We will split the sample into different subgroups, and comparing the average debt maturity in 
each group will help us to understand if there are unusual behaviors from firms with respect to the use of 
distinct debt maturities. The criteria used to subdivide firms into specific categories will be the median of 
each variable, except in the case of Z score where specific values will be used. In order to check the 
significance of differences in average debt maturities between each subgroup we will run two sample 
mean comparison t-tests in the case of comparing two averages and the Anova simple factor test when 
there are three or more different averages.  
The econometric analysis will use panel data methodology in order to study the determinants of debt 
maturity of SMEs. We run the Breusch and Pagan test to choose between pooled effects or random effects 
model. The pooled regression hypothesis is rejected [F² (1) = 2563.08; p < 0.0000]. We then run the 
Hausman test in order to understand which method, random or fixed effects model, best suits our model. 
The random effects model is rejected [F² (11) = 38.51; p < 0.0001]. Using the fixed effects model, we run 
the regression with all explanatory variables for the sample period. Again, we divide the full sample into 
distinct subgroups, using the same criteria as stated above, in order to see if the debt maturity behaves 
differently for each subgroup. All tests and analysis are made using the statistical software Stata 12.0. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Looking to the yearly variation on the average debt maturity for the 1,998 sampled firms during the 
three years analyzed (please see Table 1 bellow), we found evidence of: 
x An increase from 26.5% in 2009 to 31.9% in 2011, meaning that firms used on average 5.4% more 
long term debt in their businesses. This was a surprising finding, considering the contraction of the 
Portuguese economy and at a time where credit supply is said to be scarce, mainly to SMEs;  
x The median debt maturity, although following the same trend as the average, is significantly lower 
than the latter every year, indicating the presence of some upward extreme values; 
x Comparing the variation of debt maturity between SMEs and non-financial firms of the PSI20a we 
find, as expected, that large firms have higher debt maturities (with a decreasing trend) while average 
debt maturity of SMEs have a positive slope with both groups converging to close values in 2011. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable debt maturity (DMT) for each year for the 
full sample and for the non-financial firms of the PSI20.  
 
Years Full Sample Mean Full Sample Median PSI20 Mean 
2009 0.265 0.043 0.357 
2010 0.283 0.103 0.351 
2011 0.319 0.180 0.341 
    
 
a PSI20 is a benchmark stock market index of companies that trade on NYSE Euronext Lisbon. 
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In Table 2 we analyze average and median debt maturity for the several firm´s sizes (micro, small and 
medium) and we show evidence of an increasing trend, either in average or in median debt maturities for 
the sample period. Focusing now on the average, micro firms have higher average debt maturity each 
year, although showing the lowest increasing trend, with an increase of approximately 20% from 2009 to 
2011 compared with an approximately 40% increase for small sized firms and a 30% increase for medium 
sized ones. Table 2 also shows that micro sized firms are the ones with higher average debt maturity 
(29.2%) while small and medium sized firms have almost the same average debt maturity (22% and 
21.7% respectively). We run the Anova single factor test comparing the three averages and find a 
statistically significant difference below the 1% significance level. Because of this unexpected result 
(micro firms having longer debt maturities than small and medium sized enterprises), we divided the 
sample in half, one half below the median for SIZ and the other half above that same median. There are 
statistically significant difference between the two means, being the average debt maturity for larger firms 
(30.13%) higher than the average debt maturity for smaller firms (27.69%) which is the result we 
expected for the relation between size and debt maturity. 
 
Table 2 - Reports median and average debt maturities for micro, small and medium sized firms  
 
  2009 2010 2011 2009-2011 
  Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Mean N 
Micro 0.039 0.268 1920 0.091 0.285 1910 0.180 0.322 1915 0.292 5745 
Small 0.142 0.182 64 0.161 0.226 74 0.178 0.256 72 0.220 210 
Medium 0.053 0.181 14 0.120 0.227 14 0.210 0.236 11 0.217 39 
 
In order to find if there were any significant differences in the average debt maturity in firms with 
different characteristics, we separate highly leveraged firms from low leveraged firms, firms with positive 
net income from firms with negative Net Income, and firms with high asset maturity from firms with low 
asset maturity (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3 - Average debt maturity according to leverage, Net Income and asset maturity 
 
 2009 2010 2011 
Leverage (High / Low) 0.305 0.225 0.323 0.243 0.360 0.279 
Net Income (Positive / Negative) 0.256 0.285 0.273 0.305 0.299 0.353 
Asset Maturity (High / Low) 0.308 0.250 0.333 0.247 0.285 0.285 
 
Firms that have less proportion of debt in their balance sheets use shorter debt maturities than those 
who are more leveraged. The results show that highly leveraged firms have approximately 8 pp higher 
average debt maturities than those with lower leverage every year.  One reason for this could be that a 
company with higher financial autonomy has the ability to renegotiate debt contracts with better credit 
conditions taking advantage of roll over strategies thus having more short term debt. The average debt 
maturity is higher for firms with negative Net Income. As expected, firms with higher asset maturity 
present higher debt maturities. Running the t-test we find the differences for leverage and assets maturity 
to be statistically significant at the 1% level, while for the Net Income it is at the 5% level. 
The results in Table 4 are in accordance with Diamond´s (1991) theory, i.e., the tradeoff between 
signaling and liquidity risk led both low and high quality firms to have more short term debt while 
intermediate quality firms have more long term debt. We run the Anova test for a single factor and 
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confirm a statistically significant difference below the 1% significance level (p-value<0.001) between the 
means of the three groups. The results are consistent with those found by Scherr and Hulburt (2001) and 
González (2012). 
 
Table 4 – Shows average debt maturity for each Z-score group and for each year from 2009 to 2011  
 
  Z<1.23 1.23<=Z<=2.9 Z>2.9 
Average DMT 0.3248 0.341 0.189 
Number of observations 2214 1974 1806 
4.2. Correlation analysis 
In unreported results we perform the Pearson correlation coefficients for all the firm specific variables 
for the whole sample. We notice a very high and significant correlation coefficient between TAN and 
CAPX (0.9814) which indicates some multicollinearity in the model. To overcome that we eliminate the 
TAN variable. Besides that, correlations between variables are low being the highest ones between Z 
score and LIQ (0.3482) and CAX and TAN (0.3017), while the lowest are between ROE and AMT, FCF 
and ROE and FCF and TAX all with a p-value < 0.001. Furthermore, we find some interesting and 
significant results like the positive, although small (0.0383), correlation between LEV and DMT at the 
1% significance level consistent with the findings of several empirical work like, Leland and Toft (1996), 
Scherr and Hulburt (2001), and Custódio et al. (2013). SIZ is also positively correlated to the dependent 
variable as predicted. CAPX has a positive and high (0.190) correlation with debt maturity at the 1% 
significance level, as a proxy for growth options we were expecting to find this result as firms who invest 
more in their physical assets, usually use them as collateral to obtain better credit conditions thus being 
able to borrow long term. CAX is negatively correlated (0.1436) with DMT at the 1% significance level 
which is in accordance with Custódio et al. (2013) where the authors found out that firms with more cash 
holdings usually used more short term debt. Finally, Z score is found to be negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable also at the 1% significance level, although with a small coefficient (0.0357) this 
relation is in accordance with Diamond´s (1991) theory where firms with lower risk of insolvency (high Z 
score) issue debt of shorter maturity in order to signal high quality to the market. 
4.3. Regression analysis  
We run a fixed effects regression model with our panel data. The results are reported in Table 5. 
Altman´s Z score (1968) measures firm´s default risk which in our regression is statistically significant 
with a p-value below the 1% significance level (<0.001) and with a small negative coefficient, meaning 
that it is negatively related to debt maturity. The interpretation of Z score is as follows: a company is safe 
or with very low default risk if Z is higher than 2.9; if its values are between 1.23 and 2.9, there is a cause 
for concern and caution before investing in that firm is recommended; if the value is below 1.23, there is a 
high probability of default and the company is heading to bankruptcy. If Z score is higher for firms with 
lower default probability, then the negative relation found with debt maturity means that firms with lower 
default probability tend to use shorter debt maturity, which is consistent with Diamond´s (1991) tradeoff 
theory. In addition to that, we run the regression (unreported) for each subgroup (low, medium and high 
quality firms), and for medium quality firms the signal of the coefficient changed from negative to 
positive while still significant. This means that for firms with medium default risk, there is a positive 
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relation with debt maturity. Consistent with Diamond´s (1991) theory where intermediate quality firms 
chose to issue more long term debt while low and high quality firms tend to issue more short term debt. 
 
Table 5 - Fixed effects regression for the full sample.  
 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Robust Std. Error t-value p-value 
Constant  -0.3093525 .2666 -1.16 0.246 
LEV + 0.021386 .0165425 1.29 0.196 
RD - 0.278584 .2403221 1.13 0.258 
SIZ + 0.0434735 .0218985 1.99 0.047 
CAPX + 0.2281854 .0612432 3.73 0.000 
AMT + -2.14E-09 5.03e-10 -4.26 0.000 
CAX - 0.0059354 .0476154 0.12 0.901 
ROE - 0.0004677 .0004839 0.97 0.334 
TAX ± 0.0000115 4.40e-06 2.62 0.009 
FF + -6.95E-09 4.01e-08 -0.17 0.862 
Z ± -9.72E-06 2.72e-06 -3.58 0.000 
FCF + 0.0000937 .0001649 0.57 0.570 
LIQ - 1.74E-06 9.30e-07 1.87 0.061 
N = 5994 Adjusted R² = 0.6793 F(12, 1997) = 6.21 
 
Size is statistically significant below the 5% significance level and positively correlated with debt 
maturity. As an inverse proxy of information asymmetry (smaller firms are usually the ones who are more 
affected by asymmetric information) the results obtained are consistent with those found by López-Gracia 
et al. (2010) for Spanish SMEs. Their findings showed that smaller firms used debt of shorter maturities 
than larger firms do. The same happens for Portuguese SMEs. Barclay and Smith (1995) also found a 
positive relation between size and debt maturity for firms with less than $1 billion of market value. 
AMT is significant and negatively related to debt maturity. This study shows evidence that firms do 
not match their debt and asset maturities: in fact, our data reveals that firms choose shorter debt maturities 
when they have longer asset maturities. This finding is not very surprising giving the fact that most of the 
companies in our dataset are micro sized firms who are forced by financial institutions to borrow in the 
short term because of their size, lack of transparency and default probability. So, even if those firms 
wanted to match their debt and asset maturities, it is hard when their loans have such small maturities. 
TAX is statistically significant in the 1% significance level and establishes a very small but positive 
relation with DMT. When we run the regression (unreported) for only those firms with low liquidity, we 
find a significant and negative relation between TAX and DMT. We find similarities with the results 
obtained by Antoniou et al. (2006) evidencing the clientele argument proposed by Scholes and Wolfson 
(1992): on their study, German companies showed a positive and significant relation between the 
effective tax rate and debt maturity, while French and UK firms showed insignificant results. They 
attributed the findings to a “relatively higher rate of tax in Germany” (Antoniou et al., 2006:187). But 
there is an exception for this theory in our dataset, when we run the regression for only those firms with 
low liquidity, we find a significant and negative relation between TAX and DMT which contradicts the 
clientele argument. Comparing the corporate tax rates of Germany and Portugal we see some similarities 
with tax rates around 29% and 25% for Germany and Portugal respectively. 
Our result for LIQ is statistically significant below the 10% significance level and positively correlated 
with debt maturity. We can say that our results are partially in accordance with Diamond´s (1991) theory 
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in the sense that the positive relation found with debt maturity means that low liquid firms tend to use 
more short term debt. We subdivided firms into high and low liquid relatively to the median liquidity and 
run the regression for each subgroup founding an interesting result. It appears to be the case that for low 
liquid firms, TAX continues to be significant below the 10% significance level but the signal of the 
coefficient changed from positive to negative meaning that low liquid firms tend to issue more short term 
debt when their tax expense is higher. 
We find CAPX to be statistically significant at the 1% significance level and positively correlated with 
debt maturity with the strongest coefficient of our significant variables. In average a 1 pp increase of 
CAPX leads to an increase of 0.23 pp in DMT. This evidence indicates that firms with more physical 
assets to use as collateral when discussing credit conditions are getting longer debt maturities. Because 
CAPX is working as an inverse proxy for growth options, meaning that those firms with more physical 
assets usually have less growth opportunities, we can affirm that the positive relation found with debt 
maturity is in accordance to Myers (1977) where the author defended the idea that firms with more 
growth opportunities should use more short term debt. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
Strong evidence was found that partially confirms Diamond´s (1991) theory, Portuguese SMEs with 
lower default probability issue more short term debt while those with medium default probability tend to 
issue debt with longer maturities which is partially consistent with our third hypothesis. This behavior is 
due to the interaction between signaling and liquidity risk caused by short term debt, which while 
reducing borrowing costs also increases the risk of the company lacking liquidity to meet its short term 
obligations. Furthermore, when analyzing the liquidity of Portuguese SMEs we discovered that low liquid 
firms tend to use more short term debt also partially in accordance with Diamond´s (1991) theory. Low 
quality firms, which have poor liquidity, are imposed by financial institutions to borrow short term in 
order to allow for often monitoring and thus, decreasing the risk for those financial institutions. 
The size of each enterprise is relevant when talking about information asymmetries as smaller firms 
reveal less information about themselves, they have usually more information asymmetry and issue more 
short term debt as a consequence because financial institutions are reluctant to concede longer debt 
maturities when information about the company is lacking. Our results show that smaller firms (those 
more affected by information asymmetries) use debt of shorter maturities consistent to the second 
hypothesis and confirming the findings of Stohs and Mauer (1996) and López-Gracia et al. (2010). 
Contrary to the match hypothesis, this study did not find evidence of firms matching their debt and 
asset maturities, rejecting our first hypothesis: in fact, our data reveals that firms have shorter debt 
maturities when they have longer asset maturities. This finding is expected giving the fact that most of the 
companies in our dataset are micro sized firms which are forced to borrow in the short term because of 
their size, lack of transparency and default probability. Thus, even if those firms wanted to match their 
debt and asset maturities, it would be hard when their loans have such small maturities. 
Consistent with the clientele argument proposed by Scholes and Wolfson (1992), firms affected by 
higher tax rates tend do use longer debt maturities confirming the fifth hypothesis, except in the case of 
low liquid firms where the results contradict the clientele argument showing a negative relation with debt 
maturity. The explanation given by the authors for the clientele argument is that firms with higher 
marginal tax rates will naturally choose longer debt maturities in order to take advantage of tax shields. 
When comparing our results to those found by Antoniou et al. (2006) we discovered similarities with 
their findings concerning the relation between debt maturity and tax rates for German companies, also 
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consistent with the clientele argument. We justify our findings with the same justification presented by 
Antoniou et al. (2006): a relatively higher tax rates both in Portugal and Germany for the time period. 
Firms with more physical assets, which can be used as collateral, are getting longer debt maturities. 
Confirming our fourth hypothesis concerning growth opportunities, this finding goes along with Myers 
(1977) where the author defended the idea that firms with more growth opportunities should use more 
short term debt allowing debt renegotiations before growth options are exercised. 
Our sixth hypothesis concerning agency costs of debt received mixed support. In the one hand, two of 
the proxies used were statistically insignificant. Portuguese SMEs do not seem to be using leverage and 
the free cash flow to avoid the risk shifting or overinvestment problems. On the other hand we found 
evidence that firms with more growth opportunities use more short term debt. Furthermore, the relation 
between cash holdings and debt maturity for U.S. industrial firms (Custódio et al., 2013), indicating that 
firms with more cash were borrowing with shorter maturities, is not consistent with the Portuguese reality 
of SMEs where no relation between the two variables was found. 
This empirical study presents some limitations though, more specifically, the small sample of 1,998 
SMEs and a limited time period of three years 2009-2011. Furthermore, some of the proxies used as well 
as some assumptions made may not be consensual to all authors but that is part of the difficulty of using 
proxies to explain firm´s behaviors. A recommendation for future research that we would like to make is 
to compare the findings of this empirical work with others concerning SME´s debt maturity in different 
countries for the same time period as well as studying debt maturity within SME´s for a greater time 
period in order to understand if there are significant differences when comparing a time before the 2008 
financial crisis and after. Besides the limitations, we believe this empirical study is a contribution to the 
financial literature providing a better understanding on Portuguese SMEs and the way they make 
decisions about their debt maturities. We show that Portuguese SMEs follow some of the theories 
provided by the financial literature like Diamond´s (1991) on signaling and liquidity risk hypothesis, 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) on the clientele argument and Myers (1977) on the underinvestment problem 
and reveal some possible explanations to why they do not follow the remaining theories. 
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Appendix 
Variables’ Definitions 
Altman´s Z score (Z): Ratio of current assets minus current debt to total assets multiplied by 0.717 plus the ratio of retained 
earnings to total assets multiplied by 0.847 plus the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to total assets multiplied by 3.10 
plus the ratio of the book value of equity to total debt multiplied by 0.420 plus the ratio of sales to total assets multiplied by 
0.998; Asset Maturity (AMT): Ratio of PPE to the annual depreciation; Capital Expenditures (CAPX): Ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets; Cash (CAX): Ratio of cash holdings to total assets; Debt Maturity (DMT): Proportion of debt 
maturing in more than one year; Financial Flexibility (FF): Proportion of fixed assets in total assets multiplied by the ratio of 
net fixed assets to the annual depreciation plus the proportion of client accounts in total assets multiplied by the ratio of 
receivables to sales plus the proportion of stock in total assets multiplied by the ratio of stock to sales plus the proportion of the 
rest of current assets in total assets; Free Cash Flow (FCF): Ratio of cash flow to total assets multiplied by the ratio of 1 to 
growth where growth is the ratio of sales in year "t" to sales in year "t-1"; Leverage (LEV): Ratio of total debt to total assets; 
Liquidity (LIQ): Ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Research & Development (RD): Ratio of investment in research 
and development to total assets; Return on Equity (ROE): Ratio of net income to total equity; Size (SIZ): Natural logarithm 
of the book value of total assets; Tangibility (TAN): Ratio of PPE to total assets; Taxes (TAX): Ratio of income tax expense 
to pre-tax income; Medium-sized firm: < 250 employees and, a turnover <= 50 million euros or a balance sheet total <= 43 
million euros; Small firm: < than 50 employees and, a turnover <= 10 million euros or a balance sheet total <= 10 million 
euros; Micro-sized firm: < than 10 employees and, a turnover <= 2 million euros or a balance sheet total <= 2 million euros. 
 
 
